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Public Health Advocacy to
Change Corporate Practices:
Implications for Health Education
Practice and Research
Nicholas Freudenberg, DrPH
Corporate practices, such as advertising, public relations, lobbying, litigation, and sponsoring scientific
research, have a significant impact on the health of the people in the United States. Recently, health professionals
and advocates have created a new scope of practice that aims to modify corporate practices that harm health. This
article describes how corporate policies influence health and reviews recent health campaigns aimed at changing
corporate behavior in six industries selected for their central role in the U.S. economy and their influence on
major causes of mortality and morbidity. These are the alcohol, automobile, food, gun, pharmaceutical, and
tobacco industries. The article defines corporate disease promotion and illustrates the range of public health
activities that have emerged to counter such corporate behaviors. It analyzes the role of health professionals,
government, and advocacy groups in these campaigns and assesses the implications of this domain for health
education practice and research.
Keywords: health promotion; corporations; public health policy; advocacy
In recent years, citizens, consumer and health activists, state and local government
officials, and health professionals have created a new arena of public health advocacy
designed to change corporate policies that damage health. Tobacco control activists have
been at the forefront, winning new legislation to restrict advertising, limit public smok-
ing, and raise excise taxes and forcing the tobacco industry to contribute billions of dol-
lars to pay for tobacco-related illnesses and support efforts to reduce smoking (Glantz &
Balbach, 2002; Kluger, 1997; Schroeder, 2004). More recently, however, consumer and
environmental activists have also targeted the automobile industry for its production and
advertising of unsafe and polluting sports utility vehicles (SUVs; Bradsher, 2002;
Gladwell, 2004). Health, food, and nutrition groups have challenged the food industry for
its contributions to obesity and diabetes (Nestle, 2002, 2003), and antiviolence, public
safety, and health organizations have opposed the marketing and production practices of
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the gun industry (P. H. Brown & Abel, 2003; Diaz, 1999). Mothers Against Drunk Driv-
ing and its allies have criticized the alcohol industry for its youth-oriented advertising
(Hamilton, 2000); health professionals, senior citizens, and health care reformers have
taken on the pharmaceutical industry for making windfall profits based on publicly
funded research, covering up harmful side effects of their products, and disease monger-
ing, creating, or exaggerating new diagnoses to promote sales of their products (Angell,
2004; Moyniham, Heath, & Henry, 2002; Topol, 2004).
This special section of Health Education & Behavior examines this new public health
advocacy to change health-damaging corporate behavior and analyzes its implication for
health education practice and research. In this article, I define the concept of disease pro-
motion, review the scientific and political rationale for efforts to change corporate behav-
ior, and provide an overview of the scope of this emerging arena of health advocacy. I also
explore its implications for health education practice and research.
In the next article, Dorfman, Wallack, and Woodruff (2005) use the concept of framing
to assess commonalities among recent public health campaigns to control, for example,
the tobacco, food, and gun industries, and to analyze the underlying philosophical and
moral frameworks for these debates. They suggest that health educators can use new
insights on framing from research in communications, political science, sociology, and
media studies to win broader public support for health objectives. In the third article,
Nathanson (2005) compares the achievements of tobacco control movements in the
United States, Canada, France, and Great Britain. She argues that political systems, his-
torical traditions, and government structures in each nation create unique opportunities
and constraints for tobacco control and suggests that this cross-national perspective can
help health educators and other health professionals plan more effective strategies.
Finally, Kreuter (2005) examines the relevance of this new public health practice and
locates it within the context of health promotion both in the United States and around the
world.
THE SCIENCE AND POLITICS OF DISEASE PROMOTION
Disease promotion describes organizational practices or policies that encourage un-
healthy behaviors, lifestyles, or environments. The concept is based on the social deter-
minants of health literature, which identifies social, political, and structural factors and
processes that contribute to patterns of health and disease. Recently, researchers have
called for greater attention to these determinants and have advocated increased scientific
and professional efforts to develop interventions that address this level of causation
(Marmot, 2002; Tarlov & St. Peter, 2000; Wilkinson, 1996). In addition, disease promo-
tion borrows from the concept of health promotion and its emphasis on agency—the abil-
ity to act to improve health—but reverses the focus to spotlight actors and actions that
harm health.
No level of social organization has a monopoly on disease promotion: cells, organs,
individuals, groups, organizations, government, and ecosystems can each act to advance
disease. Our focus here, however, is on population health and therefore on organizational
agents of disease promotion. The goal of studying the process of disease promotion is to
identify opportunities for prevention.
Corporations have long been an essential component of American society. In the late
19th century, they emerged as central agents of the American economy, and today, most
observers agree that they dominate the global economy (Bakan, 2004; Berle & Means,
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1968; Friedman, 1982; Galbraith, 1952). Their actions shape every aspect of our health
and lives, from the food we eat and the air we breathe to our concepts of democracy, sexu-
ality, intimacy, and self-worth. Obviously, corporations play a vital role in our economy:
They provide millions of jobs, produce many of the goods and services that distinguish
the American lifestyle, pay taxes, and contribute to charity.
But it is equally evident that corporate practices play a central role in America’s health
problems. According to a recent Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
report (Mokdad, Marks, Stroup, & Gerberding, 2004, 2005), in 2000, products of the
tobacco industry were estimated to kill 435,000 Americans a year; diet and physical inac-
tivity, in part because of food industry advertising and the easy availability of high-fat,
high-calorie foods, were implicated in at least 365,000 deaths; alcohol was associated
with 85,000 deaths, including homicides, automobile accidents, and alcohol-related dis-
eases, such as cirrhosis and liver cancer; 43,000 Americans died in automobile accidents,
and several thousand additional deaths were associated with automobile pollution; and
29,000 Americans died in gun-related homicides, suicides, or accidents, and many more
were injured. Finally, by pricing its drugs out of reach of people who need them, opposing
policies that would lower prices, covering up life-threatening side effects, and focusing
on the most profitable drugs rather than those that best protect public health, the drug
industry contributes to many excess deaths (Angell, 2004; Topol, 2004). In addition to the
lost lives, the products of these industries cost consumers, taxpayers, and the larger soci-
ety billions of dollars of costs in health care and lost productivity (CDC, 2002;
Finkelstein, Fiebelkorn, & Wang, 2003). Sturm (2002) has estimated that the annual U.S.
health care costs associated with obesity are $395 per person, with current or former
tobacco use $230 per year and with problem drinking $150 per year, costs that can be seen
in part as industry taxes on society and individuals.
Obviously, not every death or illness related to a particular product can be blamed on
corporate practices. No complex health problem has a single cause, and undoubtedly, bio-
logical, behavioral, cultural, and environmental factors contribute to morbidity and mor-
tality from tobacco, food, automobile, guns, alcohol, and pharmaceuticals. Here, the
epidemiological concept of attributable risk is helpful. Attributable risk indicates the
absolute incidence of a condition that can be attributed to a causal factor; it is a function of
both relative risk (the ratio of incidence in those exposed versus those not exposed) and
the prevalence of the causal factor (Susser, 1973). Precisely because corporate practices,
such as advertising and political interference with regulation, are so ubiquitous, their
influence is significant. To give a hypothetical example, even if exposure to fast food
advertising contributed much less to obesity than an obesity gene at the individual level,
the fact that so many more people are exposed to advertising than carry the obesity gene
would mean that advertising caused more cases of obesity than genetic factors.
Clearly, the number of tobacco and gun deaths would decline precipitously if these
industries did not produce, promote, and distribute their products; their efforts to re-
sist public control have contributed substantially to mortality. On the other hand, the
food, automobile, and pharmaceutical industries produce goods that can both en-
hance and damage health. However, the fact that an industry may contribute to health
problems should not discourage investigation of policies aimed at limiting its harmful
consequences.
Future research is needed to quantify the attributable risk related to specific industry
practices. But the pervasive exposure to disease-promoting practices and the very sub-
stantial health burden the products of these industries impose require public health pro-
fessionals to examine whether changing the behavior of corporations is a promising strat-
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egy for improving public health and achieving national health goals, such as those
articulated in Healthy People 2010 (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services,
1999).
Some evidence supports the value of policy change to modify corporate behavior. In
1998, the Congressional Prevention Coalition, a bipartisan group of more than 60 law-
makers dedicated to prevention, asked the Partnership for Prevention (2000), a nonprofit
nonpartisan group, to assess opportunities for prevention. Based on interviews with more
than 80 public health researchers, the group identified several policies with the greatest
potential for reducing mortality and morbidity. Six strategies with potential for saving
almost 250,000 lives a year require changing corporate practices or overcoming corpo-
rate opposition. Table 1 shows these six policies and the expert panel’s estimate of the
number of lives each change would save annually.
In this article, I have chosen to focus on six industries (tobacco, food, automobile, gun,
alcohol, and pharmaceutical) because of their central role in health and disease, their
importance to the U.S. and global economies, and their economic and political influence
and because public health advocates have already acted to modify their practices (Advo-
cates for Highway and Auto Safety, 2001; Angell, 2004; Center on Alcohol Marketing
and Youth, 2002; Diaz, 1999; Glantz & Balbach, 2002; Nestle, 2002).
A FRAMEWORK FOR THE STUDY OF HEALTH ADVOCACY
TO CHANGE CORPORATE PRACTICES
A systematic study of health advocacy to change corporate practices would benefit
from a framework that focuses on variables of interest and allows comparisons across
industries, cases, and levels of social organization (e.g., local, state, or national).
Figure 1 shows such a conceptual model for the study of campaigns to change cor-
porate behaviors that harm health. I propose it as a heuristic to guide future research, sub-
ject to modification based on empirical findings. These campaigns are shaped by the
broader social and political context (Box 1 in Figure 1), which includes political struc-
tures (Nathanson, 2005), economic conditions, cultural beliefs, and historical influ-
ences (Cohen, 2003; Hertz, 2001). The second row shows each of the three principal
actors: corporations and their allies (Box 2); the government, including the federal, state,
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Table 1. Priorities for Policy Change
Policy Estimated Lives Saved in 1 Year
Increase the federal tax on tobacco products 100,000 premature deaths averted
Affirm authority of FDA to regulate tobacco products
and tobacco advertising
140,000 deaths averted
Ban smoking in enclosed public spaces and work sites 2,200 deaths averted
Establish strict uniform drinking laws throughout the
country
1,900 deaths averted
Enact a substantial increase in the federal excise tax
on alcoholic beverages
3,300 deaths averted
Enact handgun registration and licensing laws nationwide 775 deaths averted
SOURCE: Partnership for Prevention (2000).
NOTE: FDA = Food and Drug Administration.
and local levels and the executive, legislative, and judicial branches (Box 3); and public
health and advocacy organizations (Box 4), which includes health departments (which
thus may appear in both Boxes 3 and 4; see Wolfson, 2001, for a discussion), health care
providers, professional organizations, advocacy groups, and others. Each of these actors
has organizational structures, histories, cultures, and connections with various networks
and faces external pressures that influence their behaviors. In the third row, the focus is on
this behavior itself, the actions that corporations (Box 5) and health professionals and
advocates (Box 6) take in their efforts to change or defend corporate practices and poli-
cies deemed to harm health. As shown in the fourth row, these interactions shape health
outcomes (Box 7), which are also influenced by other biological, environmental, behav-
ioral, social, and political factors. The vertical and horizontal arrows in Figure 1 show the
dynamic character of these public health campaigns and also the multiple opportunities
for intervention.
For public health advocates, the central question is the following: What actions can
best ensure that their activities lead to improved health outcomes? For health researchers,
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Figure 1. Conceptual model for the study of campaigns to change corporate practices that harm
health.
the key questions are the following: What is the relative efficacy of these interventions
compared to others, what factors influence the process and outcome of these interactions,
and to what extent can findings derived from one campaign or one industry be general-
ized to another? In the next section, I examine some of the actors and actions engaged in
campaigns to change corporate practices.
CORPORATE ACTORS AND ACTIONS
Corporate practices and policies that damage health are carried out by a variety of
actors. Although corporations, such as Philip Morris (Kessler, 2001), Colt Industries
(P. H. Brown & Abel, 2003), and Merck (Hawthorne, 2003), have played central roles in
defending their own practices against public health critics, other players are also impor-
tant. Advertisers, for example, design and carry out campaigns to increase sales of harm-
ful products. Trade associations, such as the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers
Association (Angell, 2004) and the National Shooting Sports Foundation (P. H. Brown &
Abel, 2003), often serve as the public voice of industries. Lobbying and law firms, such as
Hill and Knowlton (Kluger, 1997) and Verner, Liipfert, Bernard, McPherson, and Hand
(Pertschuk, 2001), often act to advance the legislative and legal agendas of several of the
industries reviewed here. Retail associations also contribute to lobbying and legislation
at the state and local levels. Citizen organizations also act to defend corporations. The
National Rifle Association (NRA), for example, is one of the most influential organiza-
tions in Washington, D.C., and often acts to defend the gun industry (P. H. Brown & Abel,
2003).
A few analysts have assessed the respective roles of these actors in specific circum-
stances (Bradsher, 2002; P. H. Brown & Abel, 2003; Nestle, 2002; Pertschuk, 2001), but
more research is needed to identify the particular and generalizable contributions of each
and the implications for advocacy campaigns.
Corporate Behaviors That Promote Diseases
Corporations and their allies engage in a variety of actions to advance their agendas.
Advertising. Advertising seeks to create new customers and encourage existing ones
to purchase more. When the product being advertised is lethal (as in the case of tobacco or
guns) or can easily be used in ways that harm health (e.g., alcohol, SUVs, and some
pharmaceuticals), advertising falls squarely within the rubric of disease promotion. The
six target industries spend vast amounts on advertising, as shown in Table 2. In 2003, the
domestic advertising spending for these six industries alone ($38.7 billion) was 7 times
greater than the combined total budgets of the U.S. CDC and Prevention ($3.84 billion),
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA; $1.45 billion), the Federal Trade Commission
($176.5 million), and the Consumer Safety Product Commission ($57 million; U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services, 2003).
As manufacturers saturate their potential customers in one population, advertising
seeks new markets, thus creating the potential to spread risks to health. For example,
the tobacco industry targets African Americans and smokers in the developing world
(Balbach, Gasior, & Barbeau, 2003), the gun industry persuades women to buy handguns
to feel safer (Brady, n.d.), and the alcohol industry markets sweet wine coolers to young
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drinkers (Garfield, Chung, & Rathouz, 2003). In recent years, drug companies have
advertised prescription drugs directly to consumers. “Feeling sad? Anxious? Tired?”
asks a Pfizer ad for the antidepressant drug Zoloft (Ives, 2003). Although drug and media
companies claim that these ads empower consumers to make informed choices and com-
municate better with their doctors, consumer advocates claim they downplay side effects
or adverse reactions and may lead some patients to pressure doctors to prescribe medi-
cines they do not need (Ives, 2003).
Public Relations. Public relations fosters a positive public image for corporate Amer-
ica and blocks proposals that harm its perceived interests (Marchand, 1998). When critics
challenge the safety of a product, corporations and their trade associations often respond
forcefully, seeking to influence the debate in such a way as to preclude action to limit
profits, restrict advertising, or regulate manufacturing or distribution. For example, when
the FDA proposed new regulations for vitamins, industry groups sponsored television
ads showing soldiers storming suburban homes to seize vitamin C bottles (Kessler, 2001,
p. 335).
To make their public messages more credible, industries may create front groups to act
as their public voice. Philip Morris formed the National Smokers Alliance to contest
tobacco regulation (Kessler, 2001, p. 170); the tobacco, food, and restaurant industries
funded the Center for Consumer Freedom to oppose smoking bans in public places and
lower legal limits on blood alcohol levels (Brownell, 2003, p. 269); and the auto industry
hired a Washington lobbying firm to create Nevadans for Fair Fuel Economy Standards, a
paper organization that opposed higher mileage standards that would reduce pollution
(Bradsher, 2002, p. 64). To improve its public image, the food industry has supported the
American Dietetic Association (Nestle, 2002), and the tobacco industry has contributed
to arts, sports, and African American groups (Kluger, 1997).
As Dorfman et al. (2005) explain, public relations seeks to frame the public dialogue
on issues relevant to the industry. Across the six industries reviewed here, corporations
articulate strikingly similar messages: Market mechanisms provide the best remedies for
dangers to consumers, it is wrong to restrict advertising of legal products, individuals are
responsible for their own behavior, and having choices is the American way (Brownell,
2003 pp. 258-268; Diaz, 1999; Menashe & Siegel, 1998). In many cases, corporate public
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Table 2. Annual Spending on Advertising, Political Contributions, and Number of Lobbyists by
Industry
Political
Total Spending Contributions Lobbyists
on Advertising in 2002 in Washington,
Industry in 2003 ($) Election Cycle ($) 2000
Automobile 18,393,300,000 15,053,468 547
Pharmaceuticals 6,863,200,000 29,377,351 1,083
Food, beverages, and confections 6,403,000,000 42,271,951 1,367
Restaurants and fast food 4,130,800,000
Beer, wine, and liquor 1,809,500,000 12,640,565 213
Cigarettes and tobacco 376,800,000 9,150,060 254
Firearms NA 2,790,045 50
SOURCE: Advertising Age (2004); Center for Responsive Politics (n.d., 2005).
NOTE: NA = not available.
relations expenses are tax deductible, creating a public subsidy for messages intended to
thwart policy changes to protect health.
Industries also use more subtle forms of public relations to quell unfavorable portray-
als. In a stark display of the power of the tobacco industry, in the 1980s, no women’s mag-
azine that accepted tobacco advertising published a single article, editorial, or column on
the harmful effects of tobacco, despite the fact that it was then that lung cancer surpassed
breast cancer as the leading cause of cancer deaths among women (Anderson, 1995;
Hertz, 2001, p. 137). As U.S. and global media ownership becomes more concentrated
among a handful of large multinational corporations (Bagdikian, 2004), often with links
to the six industries described here, the willingness of major media outlets to investigate
corporate malfeasance or disease promotion may further diminish.
Lobbying and Other Legislative Activities. Lobbying and other legislative activities
are a central tool for advancing corporate objectives. In 2000, the Center for Responsive
Politics (n.d.) estimated that there were more than 20,000 registered lobbyists in Wash-
ington, D.C. About 1,000 lobbyists work in the nation’s capital for the food industry
(Nestle, 2002, p. 99) and 675 for the pharmaceutical industry (S. Brown & Doyle, 2004;
see Table 2). More lobbyists work in state capitals. In the mid-1990s, for example, the
tobacco industry had 25 lobbyists in Minnesota alone (Wolfson, 2001, p. 153) working to
defeat or water down that state’s tobacco regulations.
Lobbyists work both to pass legislation that benefits their employers and to defeat laws
deemed to be harmful. In 2003, the pharmaceutical industry poured millions of dollars
into a concerted, and successful, lobbying effort to convince Congress to pass legislation
that would increase coverage of senior citizens for some prescription drugs and defeat
provisions that would have allowed the federal government to negotiate lower prices on
behalf of Medicare patients or import lower cost medicines from Europe or Canada. Ana-
lysts estimated the law would increase drug company profits by $13 billion a year. Phar-
maceutical companies acted despite overwhelming public support for the restrictions
they opposed and expert opinion that the measure would leave major gaps in coverage
and fail to contain costs (Connolly, 2003). In 1994, lobbyists for the dietary supplement
industry succeeded in persuading Congress and the president to agree to label dietary
supplements as foods rather than drugs, thus escaping FDA requirements for safety and
effectiveness. A few years later, after aggressive advertising of the benefits of these prod-
ucts, deaths from supplements, such as ephedra, illustrated the public health costs of this
deregulation and led to calls for renewed public oversight (Fontarosa, Drummond, &
DeAngelis, 2003).
Corporate success at lobbying is increased by the revolving door between industry and
the government. For example, presidential adviser Karl Rove had been chief political
strategist for Philip Morris before working for Bush, and the president’s chief of staff,
Andrew Card, had been General Motors’ top lobbyist in Washington, D.C. (Bradsher,
2002). Dan Glickman, secretary of agriculture in the Clinton administration, left office to
join a law firm that lobbies for agriculture and food companies (Nestle, 2002, p. 100). In
1994, when Philip Morris needed someone to testify against FDA regulation of tobacco
before Congress, it hired former FDA Commissioner Charles Edwards, paying him
$120,000 for the consultancy (Kessler, 2001, p. 315). In 1998, 128 former members of
Congress were listed as lobbyists, 12% of all senators and representatives who had left
office since 1970 (Abramson, 1998; Nestle, 2002, p. 100). Compared to the handful of
lobbyists who advocate for public health, these personal and professional associations
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between elected and appointed officials and corporate lobbyists provide industry with a
competitive advantage in influencing legislation and regulation.
Campaign Contributions and Electoral Activities. Campaign contributions and elec-
toral activities help cement this advantage by increasing the chances that the legislators or
executive branch officials that lobbyists meet will be grateful or indebted to them. The six
industries reviewed here each make substantial campaign contributions, as shown in
Table 2. Many industry political action committees contribute to both parties, ensuring
influence no matter what the outcome of an election. In 2002, for example, the drug
industry contributed about $22 million to the Republicans and almost $8 million to Dem-
ocrats (S. Brown & Doyle, 2004). The NRA and its gun industry allies offer not only
financial support to sympathetic candidates but also assistance in voter mobilization and
campaigning (Diaz, 1999), helping to explain why the gun industry and the NRA consis-
tently win legislative victories even though public opinion polls show high levels of pub-
lic support for restrictions on assault rifles and opposition to exempting gun manufac-
turers from liability suits.
Litigation. Litigation allows industry to delay, weaken, or overturn laws and regula-
tions they dislike. The six industries have gone to court to seek action against individuals,
organizations, and government agencies that they perceived as threats to their business
goals. For example, in 1996, the Texas Cattle Ranchers Association filed a $10 million
suit against Oprah Winfrey for violating that state’s food disparagement law by saying the
threat of mad cow disease made her stop eating hamburgers. Although Winfrey ulti-
mately won, she spent more than $1 million defending herself, a cost that might deter less
wealthy critics (Nestle, 2002, pp. 162-165). In 1994, Philip Morris filed a $10 billion libel
lawsuit against ABC television for reporting that cigarettes were “artificially spiked”
with nicotine (Kessler, 2001, p. 156). A tobacco industry executive later commented that
“with one legal action—the filing of the ABC suit—the word ‘spiking’has been dropped
from the lexicon of the anti-tobacco crowd. Frankly, if that is all the suit ever does, it will
have been worth it” (Kessler, 2001, p. 169). In 2000, seven gun makers filed a suit against
Housing and Urban Development Secretary Andrew Cuomo, New York State Attorney
General (AG) Elliott Spitzer, and other state and local officials, claiming they were violat-
ing the gun makers’right to sell legal firearms by seeking to force them to accept a code of
conduct on the sale and design of handguns. The manufacturers did not seek monetary
damages but instead asked the court to bar the officials from seeking to convince local
police departments to buy weapons only from companies that had signed the agreement
(P. H. Brown & Abel, 2003).
Scientific Research. Scientific research often influences the public debates about
whether specific products harm health. Many industries seek to influence this debate by
funding scientific research that will support their case and by hiring scientists to contest
damaging information. Until the Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement eliminated it,
the Tobacco Institute funded scientists to refute links between smoking and health and to
bring this so-called evidence to the public. The food industry supports nutrition research-
ers who emphasize exercise rather than diet as the cause of obesity, and the New York
State AG recently brought the drug maker GlaxoSmithKline to court for failing to publish
or disclose studies that showed no benefit from its popular antidepressant Paxil (Harris,
2004). Krimsky (2003), who has studied corporate behavior related to scientific research,
306 Health Education & Behavior (June 2005)
uses the term manufactured doubt to describe the practice of sowing confusion to avoid or
delay regulatory action.
Illegal Activities. Illegal activities are another strategy some corporations have used to
advance their objectives. In the early 1970s, Ford Motor Company fabricated auto safety
test data, leading to a $7 million fine (Yates, 1983, p. 261). In 1994, tobacco industry
executives lied under oath to Congress about their prior knowledge on nicotine’s addic-
tiveness (Kessler, 2001), and in 1999, the U.S. Justice Department reached a $255 million
settlement with the vitamin industry for price fixing, a practice that made its products
more expensive for consumers (Nestle, 2002, p. 168). Given spotty enforcement of regu-
lations on corporate behavior, data are not available to ascertain whether illegal activities
constitute the renegade actions of a few bad apples or a common business practice.
In summary, a variety of corporate behaviors, including advertising, public relations,
lobbying, litigation, campaign contributions, and sponsored research, advance industry
objectives of increasing profits and defeating stricter regulations. Although in most cases
their activities comply with current laws, these actions nevertheless contribute to prevent-
able illnesses and deaths. In most cases, there is no evidence that corporate managers who
engage in these behaviors intend to harm health; although, the evidence of the harmful
impact is usually widely known. Many of these corporate behaviors also appear to contra-
dict free-market principles. Free markets depend on equal access to information and on
competition. When corporate interests suppress information, obfuscate public debate, or
stifle competition, they interfere with the market forces that proponents of free markets
cite as the best protection for consumers.
Has the adverse impact of corporate influence on health worsened in recent years?
Although data are not available to answer this question definitively, several trends pro-
vide cause for concern. First, advertising has increased significantly in the past 2 decades,
and corporate influence now penetrates every sphere of public and private life, from the
classrooms and malls to movies and music (Cohen, 2003). Second, corporate involve-
ment in political life has grown significantly, with increases in the number of lobbyists,
the amount of campaign contributions, and the influence of big business interests in
Washington, D.C., and state capitals (Drew, 2000). Third, since 1980, many U.S. indus-
tries have been deregulated or allowed to monitor themselves, and the remaining regula-
tory agencies are often underfunded, understaffed, and frequently criticized by corporate
and political leaders, making them less able and willing to carry out their missions (Hilts,
2003; Kessler, 2001). Finally, for a variety of reasons, a number of potentially counter-
vailing powers, such as an informed and mobilized electorate, active consumer and envi-
ronmental movements, forceful local and state officials, and a crusading media, have
declined, leaving fewer voices to challenge corporate influence (Bagdikian, 2004;
Cohen, 2003; Patterson, 2003). Whether the new public health activism described here
can become such a counterweight remains to be seen.
HEALTH AND ADVOCACY RESPONSES TO
CORPORATE DISEASE PROMOTION
A variety of constituencies have mobilized to take action to protect public health
against these corporate practices. A review of campaigns against the six target industries
reveals common actors, strategies, and outcomes.
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The Actors
Who are the individuals and organizations involved in advocating for changes in cor-
porate practices? Several key stakeholder groups have played roles in many campaigns to
modify corporate practices.
National Organizations. National organizations serve as conveners, clearinghouses,
catalysts, and advocates in government arenas. Larger organizations often have full-time
staffs of scientists, lawyers, educators, lobbyists, and organizers. Examples of such
groups include the Center for Science in the Public Interest, Union of Concerned Scien-
tists, Public Citizen, Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence, Sierra Club, American
Legacy Foundation (which also funds advocacy groups), American Lung Association,
and Mothers Against Drunk Driving. These organizations often have a detailed under-
standing of the policy process and the resources to compete with industry groups in legis-
lative and legal bodies. In some cases, the national groups can provide grassroots groups
with credibility and clout; although, they may also seek to compromise grassroots
militancy to achieve political compromises (Wolfson, 2001).
Coalitions. Coalitions bring together like-minded organizations to amplify their polit-
ical power, share resources, or coordinate strategies. Coalitions organize political strate-
gies, mobilize their constituencies, and educate the public. Most coalitions confine their
attention to a single industry (e.g., tobacco, guns, or food), but some work across local,
state, and national levels. Examples include the Coalition for a Healthy California, which
led the effort to support tobacco control propositions (Glantz & Balbach, 2002, p. 382);
the Coalition on Smoking or Health, which included several large national voluntary
health organizations (Wolfson, 2001, p. 84); the Louisiana Alliance to Prevent Underage
Drinking; and The Infant Feeding Action Coalition, which coordinated the boycott of
Nestle (2002, p. 149). Although coalitions play integral roles in campaigns to modify cor-
porate behavior, maintaining the coalition and keeping it focused on external goals can
often be demanding (Pertschuk, 2001; Wolfson, 2001).
Health Professionals and Researchers. Health professionals and researchers provide
scientific and technical expertise to efforts to modify health-damaging policies. They
conduct original research, summarize available evidence, testify at public hearings or in
court cases, and educate advocates and organizers. Organizations, such as the Center on
Alcohol Marketing and Youth at Georgetown University in Washington, D.C., and the
Center for Gun Policy and Research at Johns Hopkins University, and individuals, such
as Marion Nestle, a nutritionist at New York University; Stanton Glantz, a tobacco
researcher at the University of California San Francisco; and Garen Wintimute, director
of the Violence Prevention Research Program at the University of California Davis, have
provided epidemiological and policy evidence that advocates have taken to the political
arena. Some researchers are advocates themselves, whereas others prefer to let their work
speak for itself. Of course, other scientists also work for the corporations that are the tar-
gets of advocacy campaigns; contesting industry-supported research is often a key task
for the researchers allied with advocacy efforts.
Public Health Agencies. Public health agencies, such as local and state health depart-
ments, have often become key players in campaigns against tobacco, alcohol, guns, and
other harmful products. Local health departments are often active members of tobacco
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control coalitions, often funding community organizations to carry out education and
advocacy (Wolfson, 2001). In Marin County, California, the county Department of
Health and Human Services joined a coalition that successfully supplanted Miller Brew-
ing Company as a sponsor for the county fair, using its booth at the fair to educate about
alcohol rather than give out beer (Marin Institute, 2004). Some local health departments
have also supported efforts to end the sales of high sugar soda in schools (Fried & Nestle,
2002). At the federal level, a few administrators have taken stands against health-damaging
industries. As head of the FDA, for example, Kessler (2001) led the fight against the
tobacco industry, and Dr. Jeffrey Runge, of the National Highway Traffic Safety Admin-
istration, has been an outspoken critic of the automobile industry’s failure to make safer
cars (Skrzycki, 2003).
Legal Groups. Legal groups are at the front line of the litigation against the tobacco,
automobile, food, and gun industries. Using class action lawsuits, they have sought dam-
ages, injunctions, and changes in advertising or manufacturing. Players include lawyers
at universities and nonprofit groups, such as John Banzaf at George Washington Univer-
sity, the Northeastern University School of Law’s Tobacco Products Liability Project,
and the Legal Action Project of the Brady Campaign to Prevent Gun Violence, and at law
firms, such the Castano Group in New Orleans, a network of lawyers active in tobacco
and gun litigation (P. H. Brown & Abel, pp. 301-303).
In the public sector, state AGs have played increasingly prominent roles in using liti-
gation to protect consumers against corporate excesses. The best known example is the
Master Tobacco Settlement negotiated by state AGs to end some forms of advertising and
to fund antitobacco activities (Schroeder, 2004). New York AG Elliot Spitzer has also
challenged the drug company GlaxoSmithKline for its failure to disclose negative infor-
mation about a popular antidepressant, Paxil (Harris, 2004).
Local Organizations. Local organizations bring debates about corporate practices
directly to their communities and often provoke a dialogue that sparks media coverage,
popular mobilization, and a response from the government or industry. In many commu-
nities, for example, anti-SUV activists ticketed SUVs, charging them with pollution and
defective safety designs (Earth on Empty, n.d.). In Philadelphia, a coalition of church and
community groups forced Philip Morris to abandon its plan to introduce a new cigarette,
Uptown, targeted at urban African Americans (Sutton, 1993).
Other Participants. Other participants in campaigns to change corporate practices
include reporters and other media representatives, elected officials, and other business
groups; for example, the insurance industry has often joined advocacy efforts to improve
car safety. Often, these parties have helped mobilize public opinion, represent a group’s
interest in the political arena, or add political heft to a campaign.
The Actions
The actors involved in campaigns to change corporate practices have used a variety of
strategies to realize their objectives. Creating a typology of actions can help provide a
framework for comparative assessment of the process and outcome of these strategies.
Getting Information. Getting information is often the first step in acting to change
health-damaging corporate behavior. Advocates for tobacco and gun control have used
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the discovery process in court cases to uncover damaging information and industry
efforts to hide such data (P. H. Brown & Abel, 2003; Kessler, 2001). National advocacy
groups, such as Public Citizen and Center for Science in the Public Interest, have used the
Freedom of Information Act to extract information about business activities from reluc-
tant regulators (Hilts, 2003, p. 197). In some cases, industry insiders with troubled con-
sciences have turned to the mass media to tell their stories, alleging, for example, that the
tobacco industry covered up harmful data and that the gun industry knew its products
were going to illegal dealers (Butterfield, 2003; Kessler, 2001).
Legislative Action. Legislative action provides public health advocates with the oppor-
tunity to suggest laws and regulations they believe will better protect public health.
Health organizations and their allies have worked to persuade lawmakers to raise taxes or
end tax breaks on tobacco, alcohol, junk food, and fuel-inefficient cars to discourage their
use (Hakim, 2004; Nicholl, 1998; Stivers, 1994); to set standards for production and
advertising of health-damaging products (P. H. Brown & Abel, 2003); to modify zoning
or land use laws to reduce access to tobacco, alcohol, or fast food (Ashe, Jernigan, Kline,
& Galaz, 2003); to restrict use of tobacco, guns, or alcohol by certain populations or in
certain places (Hemenway, 2004; Rabin & Sugarman, 2001); to mandate disclosure of
product dangers (Kessler, 2001); and to fund health education to alert the public to haz-
ards (Glantz & Balbach, 2002). To achieve these legislative objectives, advocacy groups
have educated citizens and policy makers, lobbied, used the media, organized demon-
strations and rallies, and formed coalitions.
Electoral Activities. Electoral activities take the action to the voting booth. In several
recent local, state, and national elections, supporters and opponents of tobacco and gun
control endorsed candidates, contributed money, and campaigned for politicians who
supported their cause (DeMarco & Schneider, 2000; Zakocs, Earp, & Runyan, 2001). In
some states, ballot initiatives and referenda provide another opportunity to take health
issues to the voters. In California, for example, statewide or local tobacco control advo-
cates used ballot initiatives or propositions to bring tobacco policy to the voters through-
out the 1980s and 1990s (Glantz & Balbach, 2002).
Litigation. Litigation enables advocates to bring to court corporations alleged to have
harmed health. Judges can order an end to dangerous practices, award compensatory or
punitive damages, and set a precedent that will apply in other jurisdictions. In recent
years, activists have taken each of the six industries reviewed here to court based on the
health consequences of their actions. Several recent review articles have summarized the
accomplishments and limitations of litigation as a public health strategy (Jacobson &
Soliman, 2002; Parmet & Daynard, 2000; Pearson, 1997).
Actions Aimed at Corporations. Actions aimed at corporations provide advocates the
opportunity to bring their messages directly to corporate directors or shareholders. In
their campaigns to change how the multinational Nestle Corporation marketed infant for-
mula in developing nations, activists organized a worldwide boycott that has been period-
ically reinstated during the past 3 decades (Nestle, 2002, pp. 145-158). In the state of
Washington, some activists have proposed revoking the corporate charters issued by the
state for companies that repeatedly violate the law (Parrish, 1999). Investors have also
become more active. By 2000, more than a trillion dollars was invested in U.S.-managed
portfolios that used some social investment strategy, a thirtyfold increase from 1984
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(Hertz, 2001, p. 122). Shareholder activism has, for example, forced 3M, America’s third
largest billboard company, to end tobacco advertising on its billboards, and Kimberly
Clark to sell its holdings in tobacco companies (Hertz, 2001, p. 124).
Education, Information, and Mobilization Campaigns. Education, information, and
mobilization campaigns often constitute the foundation for other strategies and also serve
to put an issue on the public agenda. Health advocates seeking to change corporate be-
havior have used counteradvertising campaigns against SUVs, tobacco, and alcohol
(Agostinelli & Grube, 2002; Glantz & Balbach, 2002; Hakim, 2003); media advocacy to
influence public opinion on alcohol, guns, and food advertising aimed at children (Holder
& Treno, 1997; Wallack, Dorfman, Jernigan, & Themba, 1993); and community organiz-
ing to mobilize constituencies to support access to lower priced pharmaceutical products
in other countries (American Association of Retired Persons, 2004). As Dorfman et al.
(2005) note, these strategies play an important role in framing conflicts between public
health advocates and corporations and thus influence the outcome of these interactions.
In the past few decades, health professionals, advocates, and their supporters have
accumulated an impressive body of experience using these strategies to influence corpo-
rate practices and policies. Each strategy has elicited counteractions by the corporate tar-
gets, and thus, strategies and tactics on both sides of these conflicts have changed contin-
ually. Systematic research is needed to identify the relative benefits and costs of these
strategies and the circumstances that contribute to successful efforts to reduce the pro-
motion of diseases.
The Outcomes
Although a comprehensive assessment of the efficacy of these strategies is beyond the
scope of this report and perhaps premature, available evidence suggests that public health
advocacy to change corporate practices has the potential to contribute to improved health.
A few examples illustrate the range of achievements.
In some cases, environmental regulations can be remarkably effective in reducing
threats to health. Between 1968 and 1983, for example, primarily as a result of new clean
air standards advocated by the environmental movement, American automobile air pollu-
tion, which contributes to lung and heart disease, was reduced by 90% (Yates, 1983).
Similarly, federal mandates for automobile seatbelts and air bags, long opposed by the
auto industry (Doyle, 2000), are now credited with saving thousands of lives because
consumer advocates persuaded Congress to require these devices (Martin, Crandall, &
Pilkey, 2000).
In California, an aggressive tobacco control program that targeted both industry prac-
tices and individuals is estimated to have reduced tobacco consumption by 75% in 10
years, a much larger reduction than in states without such programs (Glantz & Balbach,
2002, p. 5). A recent study found that following a local law banning smoking in public
places and in the workplace in Helena, Montana, the number of monthly admissions for
acute myocardial infarction from the city but not from areas where the ban was not in
effect dropped significantly (Sargent, Shepard, & Glantz, 2004), suggesting that changes
in the law may be able to produce even short-term benefits.
In Washington, D.C., a law banning the purchase, sale, transfer, or possession of hand-
guns by civilians was associated with a prompt decline in homicides and suicides in the
city but not in adjoining areas without such bans (Loftin, McDowall, Wiersema, &
Cottey, 1991). More recently, the threat of ongoing litigation led Colt Industries to decide
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to abandon much of its retail gun business and focus instead on producing for the military
and police (P. H. Brown & Abel, 2003, p. 141), a clear example of pressure leading to
changes in corporate practices.
IMPLICATIONS FOR
HEALTH EDUCATION RESEARCH AND PRACTICE
To evaluate the overall health impact of campaigns to change corporate behavior and
to develop guidelines for effective practice will require a more systematic approach to
this phenomena and a more standardized body of literature. Some of the research ques-
tions that emerged from this review include the following:
1. What is the impact of corporate characteristics, such as the position of a company
within its industry, the unique corporate culture, current profit levels, competitive-
ness within the industry, and its influence within the political arena, on a corpora-
tion’s policies and practices related to health? Under what circumstances do mar-
ket forces lead to reductions in health-damaging practices?
2. What are the potentials and limitations of health advocacy campaigns at different
levels and within different branches of the government? What shapes a particular
government agency’s responsiveness to corporate versus health advocacy de-
mands? Under what political and economic conditions are governments likely to
support or oppose public health campaigns to change corporate behavior? What
are the unique opportunities and constraints for change in different phases of
economic, budget, and electoral cycles?
3. What frames best enable public health advocates to win public support for their
goals? What are the relative advantages, disadvantages, and efficacy of the various
strategies for changing corporate behavior? What is the relative efficacy of differ-
ent types of advocacy coalitions or networks in changing corporate practices?
4. What are the specific social and behavioral processes by which corporate practices
and policies damage health? What are the specific social and behavioral processes
by which public health advocacy campaigns can mitigate or reverse these adverse
health outcomes?
5. To what extent does corporate disease promotion contribute to or exacerbate dis-
parities in health among different socioeconomic, racial, and ethnic groups? Do
campaigns to change corporate behavior offer a way to reduce these inequities?
Designing studies to answer these questions constitutes a research agenda on disease pro-
motion and advocacy to change corporate practices that can guide future intervention.
A focus on corporate practices also challenges health educators to reconsider the theo-
retical paradigms that have guided our work. For many years, the dominant paradigm in
health education has been that individual behavior and lifestyle are the primary determi-
nants of population health in the United States (Fuchs, 1998; Knowles, 1977; McGinnis
& Foege, 1993). Critics have long challenged this perspective (Freudenberg, 1978; Israel
et al., 1995; Minkler, 1989), and a more recent synthesis is that policy also has an impor-
tant influence on health and that public health interventions should seek to change indi-
viduals, organizations, and policies (Caraher & Coveney, 2004; Committee on Assuring
the Health of the Public in the 21st Century, 2003; Green & Kreuter, 2005; Melkote,
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Muppidi, & Goswami, 2000). Despite this emerging scientific consensus, the vast major-
ity of public health interventions still target only individual behavior, and few organized
interventions have made meaningful and sustained efforts to change policy at a level that
could influence population health (Bowen & Beresford, 2002; Freudenberg et al., 2000).
This focus on public health advocacy to change corporate practices also offers an
opportunity to revise the dominant paradigm. If etiologic research confirms that corpo-
rate policies have a substantial impact on morbidity and mortality here in the United
States and globally, modifying these behaviors takes on a new imperative. If evaluation
research demonstrates that the intervention strategies described here successfully modify
corporate behavior enough to reduce adverse health consequences, then public health
professionals need to master the competencies needed to develop and sustain such
interventions.
What does all this have to with health education? In 1986, the Ottawa Charter for
Health Promotion (First International Conference on Health Promotion, 1986) defined
health promotion as “the process of enabling people to increase control over, and to
improve their health” (p. 1). More than any other single profession, health educators have
as their central task educating and mobilizing individuals, organizations, and communi-
ties to promote health. Public health advocacy to change health-damaging corporate
practices has emerged as a promising strategy for health promotion. A review of accounts
of these advocacy campaigns shows that many of the core tasks in these efforts closely
parallel professional descriptions of health education competencies: framing public
health issues, mobilizing community and institutional resources, educating the public,
identifying political opportunities for action, building coalitions, and evaluating success.
Similarly, the implicit or explicit rationales for these campaigns often rely on the same
theoretical literatures that health educators use: theories on social movements, organiza-
tional and behavioral change, communications, ecological models, and empowerment
(Glanz, Rimer, & Lewis, 2003; Green & Kreuter, 2005). These parallels between health
education and health advocacy suggest that health educators already have some of the
competencies needed to play leadership and supporting roles in these campaigns.
At the same time, advocacy to change corporate practices will require new competen-
cies and perspectives. First, transferring the focus from changing the behavior of individ-
uals to one that includes modifying corporate or government action will necessitate ideo-
logical as well as skills transformation. A starting point is to examine to what extent
existing theories, such as the health belief model or social learning theories (Glanz et al.,
2003), can also help predict and then change institutional behavior. Second, current
health education practice relies heavily on cooperative and consensus-building strate-
gies, based on the liberal assumption that people of goodwill can come together and agree
on compromises. Recent advocacy campaigns to change corporate practices, however,
have often used adversarial strategies, borrowing more from social movements and con-
tentious politics (Tarrow et al., 1998) than from small group or social marketing theories.
As Kreuter (2005) notes, power is the language that corporations speak and understand
best. To prepare health educators with the skills to analyze power dynamics and the stom-
ach and backbone for political conflict that advocacy campaigns against multinational
corporations may require, training programs will need to modify their curricula.
Some health educators will raise understandable objections to an expansion of our
practice to include advocacy to change corporate behavior. Some will contest the epide-
miological evidence, asserting that the proximate role of individual behavior in current
patterns of morbidity and mortality makes it the logical focus of health education efforts,
not the more distant corporate policies. Others may agree that corporate practices play an
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important role but argue that changing such behaviors is too difficult or too risky, jeopar-
dizing funding from government or corporate sources. Another point of view is that
health educators should remain neutral rather than participate in social conflicts (e.g.,
debates on the appropriate roles for the government and markets in our society), main-
taining an objective, fair, and balanced stance. These concerns get to the heart of our defi-
nition of the role of health educators. Any expansion of health education practice to
encompass health advocacy to change corporate behavior will require open and honest
dialogue on these and related scientific, ethical, and professional questions.
Supporters of an expanded role for health education practice offer philosophical and
pragmatic responses to their colleagues’concerns. First, they argue that public health and
health education have always taken on special interests that harm health. Founders of
modern U.S. public health, such as Alice Hamilton, C. E. Winslow, Margaret Sanger,
Jane Adams, Mayhew Derryberry, and others (Rosen, 1993), tackled the employers, pro-
ducers, landlords, and medical institutions that sometimes acted against the well-being of
the public. Recently, the CDC (1999) identified the 10 greatest accomplishments of U.S.
public health in the 20th century. Four of these—improving motor vehicle safety, making
workplaces safer, producing safer and healthier foods, and recognizing tobacco as a
health hazard—involved modifying corporate practices that damaged health. Thus, say
the supporters, advocacy to change corporate practice is not a new strategy but a return to
our public health roots.
Second, borrowing from critics of the concept of scientific objectivity (Parsons,
2003), advocates argue that neutrality is a chimera and often serves to support the status
quo by refusing to challenge those with the most power. Expecting health professionals to
view the claims of the tobacco industry, for example, with equal credibility as those of
public health researchers or advocates of tobacco control defies common sense and a 50-
year historical record of deception (Glantz & Balbach, 2002; Kluger, 1997).
Supporters of advocacy campaigns to change corporate practices also reject the claim
that the public opposes such action. They point to public opinion polls that show strong
support for gun control, restricting tobacco advertising, strong public oversight of the
drug industry, regulating pollution, and holding the food industry accountable for its role
in the obesity epidemic (Batra, Patkar, Weibel, Pincock, & Leone, 2002; Nestle, 2003;
Vernick, Teret, Howard, Teret, & Wintemute, 1993).
Finally, supporters of confronting disease promoters raise a moral imperative. If the
mission of health educators is to promote health and the evidence shows that specific
actions by corporations damage health, then there is a professional and moral obligation
to act to reduce the harm. Failing to pursue promising strategies, they argue, violates
ethical standards.
Recent events suggest that both the corporate quest for greater profits and less regula-
tions and advocacy group efforts to modify corporate practices to better protect public
health will continue. Public health professionals, including health educators, will need to
decide how best to relate to these conflicts. By focusing attention on this emerging
domain and by systematically assessing the potential for advocacy to change corporate
practices to promote health, we can make informed choices about our future roles.
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